Official website of the President of Russia

In the context of the 80^th anniversary of the Victory in the Second World War and of the founding of the United Nations, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the two Sides) emphasize the utmost importance of maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability. Taking into account the serious challenges facing the international community in the sphere of international and regional security, adhering to the strong consensus reached by the Heads of the two States, and acting in the spirit of previous joint documents on this subject and the principled approaches set out therein, the two Sides state the following.

The two Sides are convinced that the destinies of the peoples of all countries are interrelated; States and their associations should not seek to ensure their own security at the expense and to the detriment of the security of other States. The two Sides call upon all States to adhere to the principle of equal and indivisible security on global and regional levels, make maximum efforts to eliminate conflicts in relations between States, build comprehensive, integrated and sustainable security throughout the world on a collective basis.

The two Sides emphasize the importance of maintaining constructive relations between major powers, including in addressing global strategic issues. Nuclear-weapon States, which bear special responsibility for international security and global strategic stability, should reject Cold War mentality and zero-sum games, resolve contradictions via dialogue on an equal footing and mutually respectful consultations, build confidence to avoid dangerous miscalculations and refrain from actions that generate strategic risks.

The two Sides state with regret that not all of the five nuclear-weapon States follow such approaches in practice. The two Sides note with concern that against the backdrop of aggravation in the relations between nuclear-weapon States, which in some cases has escalated to the threat of a direct military clash, a critical mass of problems and challenges has accumulated in the strategic sphere, and the risk of nuclear conflict has increased.

One of the most pressing strategic risks to be urgently addressed remains the highly destabilizing expansion of existing and newly formed military alliances and coalitions that is being carried out by some nuclear-weapon States close to the frontiers of other nuclear-weapon States in an attempt to establish or expand permanent footholds in such areas, which are particularly sensitive to them, for the purposes of projecting military power, exerting forceful pressure and committing other hostile activities that threaten the core security interests of those States.

It is also of serious concern that such activities are accompanied by the forward deployment of military infrastructure and advanced offensive, defensive and versatile weapon systems that can be employed to accomplish strategic missions – in particular, to perform decapitating and disarming strikes, while providing enhanced capabilities for missile interception.

In this context, of particular concern are the plans and practical steps by individual nuclear-weapon States to deploy outside their national territories ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles with short flight time to a wide range of targets in the territories of other nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, accelerated development, procurement and emplacement of long-range missile systems of this and other similar classes are carried out within the relevant military alliances and coalitions not only by nuclear-weapon States, but also by their non-nuclear allies in the framework of concepts involving the acquisition of counterforce systems for “deep precision strikes”, “kill chains”, “counterstrike capabilities”, and etc. The two Sides strongly condemn such provocative activities that undermine regional stability and global security.

Deeply destabilizing in nature is also the recently announced “Golden (Iron) Dome for America”, a large-scale program designed to establish unconstrained, global, deeply layered and multi-domain missile defense system to protect against any missile threats, including all types of missiles from “peer and near-peer adversaries”. First of all, this means a complete and ultimate rejection to recognize the existence of the inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, which is one of the central and fundamental principles of maintaining global strategic stability. The project also provides additional impetus to the further development of kinetic and non-kinetic means providing for the left-of-launch defeat of missile weapons and the infrastructure that supports their employment.

The situation is further aggravated by the fact that the “Golden (Iron) Dome for America” program also directly envisages significant strengthening of the arsenal of means to conduct combat operations in space, including the development and orbital deployment of interception systems, turning outer space into an environment for placing weapons and an arena for armed confrontation.

The two Sides oppose the attempts of individual countries to use outer space for armed confrontation and will counter security policies and activities aimed at achieving military superiority, as well as at officially defining and using outer space as a ”warfighting domain“. The two Sides confirm the need to start negotiations on a legally binding instrument based on the Russian-Chinese draft of the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects as soon as possible, that would provide fundamental and reliable guarantees for preventing an arms race in outer space, weaponization of outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects or with their help. In order to safeguard world peace, ensure equal and indivisible security for all, and improve the predictability and sustainability of the exploration and peaceful use of outer space by all States, the two Sides agree to promote on a global scale the international initiative/political commitment not to be the first to deploy weapons in outer space.

The two Sides condemn the use of commercial space systems to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign States and armed conflicts involving third countries.

Among the provocative actions undertaken by some nuclear-weapon States and posing a threat to the security of other nuclear-weapon States the one that stands out is the further development of schemes and means of so-called “nuclear sharing” and “extended nuclear deterrence” within the framework of relevant military alliances and coalitions, which provide for the employment of forward-deployed and (or) other nuclear weapons in the course of joint “integrated” operations with formally non-nuclear allies, involving the use of bases in their territories, dual-capable platforms transferred to them and (or) their own conventional forces and means, including increasingly advanced missile and anti-missile weapons. This has high potential to provoke a regional and global arms race and further escalate tensions.

The two Sides particularly note that the above mentioned offensive capabilities are openly designated by their possessors or, according to their features, can be employed for the purposes of delivering by means of high-precision conventional weapons or a combination of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems a supposedly “preventive” or “preemptive” strike, but in fact a first strike, in calculation to repel a radically weakened retaliatory strike with air and missile defense assets, thus making use of strategic advantage in offense and defense. At the same time, the integration of counterforce and missile defense components of this adventurous strategy is explicitly envisaged at the doctrinal level and implies, in particular, ensuring multi-factor support for “missile defense and defeat”.

The comprehensive implementation by individual nuclear-weapon States, with the support of their allies, of the specified conceptual and military-technical approaches, obviously aimed at weakening the reliability and effectiveness of the strategic deterrence capabilities of other nuclear-weapon States, indicates aspiration to ensure an overwhelming military superiority, “strategic invulnerability” and ultimately “absolute strategic security”. This fundamentally contradicts the logic underlying the maintenance of strategic balance and runs counter to the principle of equal and indivisible security. As a consequence, there is a combined threat of directly undermining global strategic stability, spurring an arms race and increasing conflict potential both among nuclear-weapon States and in the international arena as a whole. Moreover, such a course of action calls into question the effectiveness of efforts to maintain predictability in the nuclear and missile sphere, as well as creates hardly surmountable obstacles to the constructive consideration of nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament initiatives.

The two Sides consistently oppose such a policy in the strategic sphere that is destructive for international security. The two Sides reaffirm their commitment to The Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapons States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races of January 3, 2022 and to the principle enshrined therein that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The two Sides call on all participating States of the above-mentioned Statement to fully adhere to its provisions in practice. This implies an unwavering focus on avoiding any military confrontation between nuclear-weapon States and seeking politico-diplomatic solutions to existing disagreements on the basis of mutual respect and acknowledgement of each other’s security interests and concerns.

The two Sides stress that the priority tasks of preventing armed clashes between nuclear-weapon States, as well as reliable and long-term reduction of the conflict potential accumulated in their relations, should be addressed through comprehensive work on an equal footing with an emphasis on eliminating the root causes of fundamental contradictions and taking into account all the main factors affecting global strategic stability. The two Sides are convinced that preventive steps to avert crises and conflicts should have priority over attempts to “manage” confrontation and its escalation, while joint efforts of nuclear-weapon States to reduce strategic risks cannot be sustainable and truly effective unless encroachments by some participants of such efforts upon core interests of other participants are excluded.

The two Sides confirm that arms control is an important means for strengthening international security and stability, while actions that undermine them simultaneously undercut arms control efforts. The two Sides will endeavor to practice true multilateralism and support the central role of the UN and its multilateral disarmament mechanism in the arms control process. At the same time, the two Sides consider arms control as one of the elements of the comprehensive work to reduce potential for conflicts in the world and ensure global strategic stability.

The two Sides believe that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, essential to the global security architecture. The two Sides attach great importance to guaranteeing the integrity, effectiveness and universality of the NPT, will continue to actively cooperate in the framework of its review process, and contribute to the success of the upcoming 2026 NPT Review Conference, while jointly preventing the use of the Treaty for political purposes that have nothing to do with its provisions.

The two Sides state that the efforts undertaken by the AUKUS (US-UK-Australia) partnership to establish military infrastructure of two nuclear-weapon States in support of the activities of their nuclear forces in the territory of a State Party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty undermine strategic stability and provoke an arms race in the region.

The two Sides also note the need for further cooperation on the issues of military application of artificial intelligence technologies both in bilateral format and at specialized multilateral venues, primarily in the framework of the Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems.

In the context of the commemorating 50^th anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (BTWC) by the international community, the two Sides reiterate their commitment that the Biological Weapons Convention should be fully complied with and urge the States Parties to consistently strengthen it, in particular by institutionalizing and adopting a legally binding protocol with an effective verification mechanism. The two Sides express concern about the military biological activities of the United States of America and its allies and demand that they cease such activities that threaten the security of other States and relevant regions, both in their national territories and beyond their borders.

The two Sides confirm their commitment to building a world free of chemical weapons and call upon States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) to adopt all necessary measures to that end, as well as to restore the authority of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and contribute to putting the OPCW’s activities back to a depoliticized technical basis. The two Sides note the relevance of multilateral efforts to prevent chemical terrorism and advocate for the adoption at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva of an international convention on the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism. The two Sides urge Japan to faithfully fulfill its obligations in order to fully and completely eliminate as soon as possible the chemical weapons abandoned on the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese Side supports the Russian Side in the elections to the OPCW Executive Council.

The two Sides reaffirm adherence to the export control obligations under the NPT, BTWC, CWC, and stand opposed to the self-serving use by some countries of relevant mechanisms to technologically and economically contain other States and to apply illegitimate policy of unilateral restrictive measures. The two Sides are committed to the implementation of the UN General Assembly resolution “Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security”.

The two Sides are confident that making progress in these directions would significantly improve the situation in the sphere of international security and would also strongly stimulate the creation of a climate favorable for the further advancement on the arms control and disarmament tracks, which is to be ensured on the basis of maintaining global strategic stability and adhering to the principle of undiminished security for all.

The two Sides intend to continue in the most active manner to enhance the coordination of their approaches and to deepen the practical cooperation on maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability, as well as to jointly address common challenges and threats in this sphere.

Moscow, 8 May 2025